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ABSTRACT
This essay reads Muriel Rukeyser’s The Life of Poetry (1949) as a vital account of
pragmatist aesthetics in the vein of John Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934). It
argues that Rukeyser’s treatise is an exercise in embodied cultural experience
that draws upon the key pragmatic aesthetic tenets of pluralism and
naturalism – i.e. the understanding that knowledge is derived from a living
organism’s mind–body interaction with its environment. Further, it explores
Rukeyser’s understanding that ‘aesthetics’, as contemporary philosopher Mark
Johnson has argued, must move beyond the compartmentalised study of art
and its a/effects to ‘become the basis of any profound understanding of
meaning and thought… to explore how meaning is possible for creatures
with our types of bodies, environments, and cultural institutions and
practices’. Highlighting recent studies in neuroscience, cognitive linguistics,
and philosophy of embodied mind that are grounded in pragmatism, this
essay demonstrates Rukeyser’s foresight in constructing a cross-disciplinary,
multivalent aesthetics of human meaning-making that anticipated such
advances by decades. The Life of Poetry suggests a practical philosophy of the
art of living that breaks down the traditional binaries of mind/body, science/
art, self/other by positioning poetry pluralistically to encompass the social and
personal potentialities of embodied human experience.
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WhenMuriel Rukeyser was writing the lectures that would eventually become
The Life of Poetry (1949), her thinking was deeply influenced by, among other
areas of thought, classical pragmatism. While some scholarly attention has
been paid to the debt Rukeyser’s work of the forties and fifties owes to the phi-
losophical and political positions of pragmatists William James, Charles
Sanders Peirce, and John Dewey in the realms of cultural pluralism, war,
and democracy,1 this scholarship has not attended specifically to The Life of
Poetry, nor considered the profound connections between this unclassifiable
text and the first published treatise in what is now referred to as pragmatist
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aesthetics, Dewey’s Art as Experience (1934).2 This essay seeks to redress this
oversight, arguing for a reappraisal of The Life of Poetry as a crucial and
complex exercise in cultural aesthetics that draws from, and moves beyond,
the naturalistic, experiential philosophies of James and Dewey to anticipate
by decades the radial growth of pragmatism’s core tenets into studies that
reimagine aesthetics in everyday, embodied terms.
What remains most striking – and perhaps most relevant – about Rukey-
ser’s endeavour is its combination of insight and foresight in the fruitful con-
junction of seemingly discrete pragmatist positions in the philosophy of mind,
neuroscience, literary studies, and theory of art. Underlying and connecting
each of these areas is a philosophy of embodiment. Thus, this essay breaks
new ground, not by offering a pragmatist reading of Rukeyser’s poetry and
poetics in the way that pragmatism has been used as a lens to understand
other American poets of the twentieth century,3 but by examining how her
prose work, The Life of Poetry, constitutes a grossly overlooked but richly
multivalent, and increasingly relevant, aesthetics of human meaning,
derived from the key principles of pragmatist aesthetics. It explores how
Rukeyser creates a philosophy of the art of living by positioning poetry as a
pluralistic term to encompass the potentialities of embodied human
experience.
John Dewey’s naturalist aesthetics
Contemporary philosopher Richard Shusterman has led a recent resurgence
of interest in the cross-disciplinary applications of pragmatist aesthetics.
Along with the scholar Thomas Alexander,4 Shusterman has lamented that
by the time of Dewey’s death in 1952, his aesthetics had been ‘totally eclipsed
by analytic philosophy of art’, which largely ignored ‘art’s socio-political
dimensions and its practical, ethical, and ideological functions’.5 Acknowled-
ging the presence of these factors in Dewey’s thought, Shusterman notes that
‘one of the most central features of Dewey’s aesthetics is its naturalism’.6 This
naturalism, derived from Darwinism via William James’s psychological phe-
nomenology, situates aesthetics in ‘the natural needs, constitution, and activi-
ties of the embodied human organism’.7 In the first chapter of Art as
Experience, ‘The Live Creature’, Dewey proposes ‘recovering the continuity
of esthetic experience with normal processes of living’.8 Arguing that our
understandings of beauty and truth are embedded in the ‘vital functions’
and ‘vital needs’ we share with ‘bird and beast’,9 Dewey suggests that if
‘man derives the means by which he breathes, moves, looks, and listens, the
very brain with which he coordinates his senses and his movements, from
his animal forbears’, then ‘the esthetic in experience… starts with experience
in its elemental form’, because ‘life goes on in an environment; not merely in it
but because of it, through interaction with it’.10
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From this proposition, Dewey argues for ‘a new mode of approach’ to aes-
thetics: the dismantling of the false social and capitalist structures of ‘com-
partmentalization’ that have monetised and ‘spiritualized’ art ‘out of
connection with the objects of concrete experience’, and confined it to insti-
tutions and museums.11 ‘Art’ and ‘artistic objects’, Dewey contends, have been
‘cut off from that association with the materials and aims of every other form
of human effort, undergoing, and achievement’; ‘a wall [has been] built
around them that renders almost opaque their general significance’.12 To
‘restore continuity between…works of art and the everyday events, doings,
and sufferings that are universally recognised to constitute experience’,
Dewey calls for an aesthetic ‘theorist’ who would think across disciplines to
understand human–environment interaction in terms of fundamental
connection:
Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest upon the
earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations. It is the business of
those who are concerned with the theory of the earth… to make this face
evident in its various implications. The theorist who would deal philosophically
with fine art has a like task to accomplish.13
For Dewey, ‘fine art’ is a special instance of the expression of embodied
human meaning because it provides the perceiver and maker with an experi-
ence of ‘heightened vitality’. Isolating it from everyday life is ‘a pathetic, even a
tragic, commentary on life as it is ordinarily lived’.14 Dewey’s understanding
of aesthetic experience, then, requires a breakdown of false distinctions
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, and between art and life.
If, according to pragmatist aesthetics, separation and isolation are vitally
against nature, it is because nature is characterised by ‘adaptation through
expansion’; its order is ‘not imposed from without but is made out of the
relations of harmonious interactions that energies bear to one another’.15
Positing that ‘biological commonplaces… reach to the roots of the esthetic
in experience’, Dewey sees natural life as a ‘process’ of energy exchange,
brought about by necessary ‘tension’ in changes of phase or state to create
‘order’.16 In natural rhythms and forms such as ‘the waves of the sea’, ‘the
beating of a bird’s wing, the whorl of sepals and petals’,17 Dewey finds this
‘tension of energies’, whereby the living organism is both receptive to and gen-
erative of an active process of growth and change. He connects this growth of
form, which he sees as ‘wholly a matter of relations’18 to the work of art, which
is similarly shaped by the dynamic organisation and integration of parts.
More than this, Dewey connects these processes to the aesthetic experience
itself, because ‘art celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in which
the past reinforces the present and in which the future is a quickening of
what now is’.19
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For Dewey, ‘an esthetic experience, [which is] the work of art is its actual-
ity, is perception’.20 Figuring perception as a cumulative experience of ‘doing
and undergoing, outgoing and incoming energy’,21 Dewey defines it an ‘act of
expression’ that is ‘a construction in time, not an instantaneous emission’.22
As such, it constitutes a communicative process that connects both the
artist and the perceiver to their shared environment through memory and
emotion (‘emotion is the moving and cementing force’23): ‘What is evoked
is not just quantitative, or just more energy, but is qualitative, a transform-
ation of energy into thoughtful action, through assimilation of meanings
from the background of past experiences’.24 The key for Dewey is in art’s
ability to communicate and impart growth, which can, in turn, be directed
into social life, not least in order to dismantle the false barriers Dewey sees
between aesthetic and ordinary experience.
Dewey thus understands democracy as intrinsically connected to the aes-
thetic. A society’s creative culture is a manifestation of its effort to give value
to the intersubjective, to continually probe the human situation as something
unfinished and problematic. Democratic society, then, is ‘community dedi-
cated to life as art’, seeking ways to infuse life with meaning and value.25
Shaping its inquiries and communication towards the art of conduct, the demo-
cratic community recognises the paramount importance of education in the
pursuit of a shared, psychically and physically enriching life.
Pragmatist aesthetics thus defines art as experience and also as function. As
Shusterman explains, ‘part of Dewey’s naturalism is to insist that art’s aim “is to
serve the whole creature in his unified vitality”,…which stands in sharp con-
trast to the extreme emphasis on disinterestedness’ of Kantian, analytical aes-
thetics, andmodernist concepts of artistic value.26Dewey’s goal throughoutArt
as Experience is to demonstrate that ‘theories which isolate art and its appreci-
ation by placing them in a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes
of experiencing, are not inherent in the subject-matter but arise because of
specifiable extraneous conditions’.27 He specifies these conditions, which
insist on ‘oppositions of mind and body, soul and matter, spirit and flesh’, as
rooted ‘fundamentally, in fear of what life may – bring forth. They are marks
of contraction and withdrawal’.28 A naturalist, embodied approach would
render art usable in the service of heightening humankind’s vitality and inter-
action with the world, so that the ‘unity of sense and impulse, of brain and eye
and ear, that is exemplified in animal life’ might be saturated ‘with the con-
scious meanings derived from communication and deliberate expression’.29
‘Art,’ according to Dewey, ‘is thus prefigured in the very processes of living’.30
Muriel Rukeyser’s naturalist aesthetics
Suffering from a similar, albeit more pronounced, disappearance to Dewey’s
Art as Experience, Rukeyser’s The Life of Poetry was likewise eclipsed from
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the 1950s onwards by theories of poetics more akin to the formalism of
analytical aesthetics. An intergeneric fusion of ideas, memories, poetry, crea-
tive and philosophical prose spanning a number of subjects including the
visual, written, musical and performing arts, biological, physical, and theoreti-
cal sciences, nature, war, and the media, The Life of Poetry cannot be classified,
opening it to such criticisms as were levelled at Dewey’s aesthetical treatise: ‘a
hodge-podge of conflicting methods and undisciplined speculations’.31
Although absent from the index and acknowledgements, the imprint of Art
as Experience is often starkly discernible across the pages The Life of Poetry,
whose very title connotes the naturalistic vein of Deweyan pragmatist aes-
thetics.32 Rukeyser defines poetry herein as a holistic experience – an embo-
died, ‘total response’33 to the world in which imagination, perception, and
cognition come together to evince and invoke personal growth and social
cohesion. Where Dewey draws the simile that ‘experiencing like breathing
is a rhythm of intakings and outgivings’,34 Rukeyser likewise emphasises
the aesthetic nature of the corporeal rhythms of interactive commerce with
one’s environment. She describes aesthetic experience as something ‘taken
into the body, breathed in, so that reality is the completion of experience,
and poetry is what is produced. And life is what is produced’.35
The embodied connection between poetry and experience in Rukeyser’s
aesthetics rests on an understanding of both as ‘organic’.36 Rukeyser analo-
gises the dynamics of a poem with the relational forms and rhythms of
nature. Drawing on the work of Donald Mackenzie and D’Arcy Wentworth
Thompson, she discusses the spiral – we remember Dewey’s example of the
‘whorl’ – as a natural emblem of ‘the relationship of movement with life…
growth and form’,37 and links its pattern to the push and pull work that
images perform in a poem. Rukeyser proposes that a poem’s imagistic, rhyth-
mic, and sonic ‘interdependences’ are what allow us to feel its energy; ‘the ten-
sions and attractions between the poem’s meanings may mark its growth, as
they must if the poem is to achieve its form’.38 From here, Rukeyser extends
her analysis to the work the poem does both on the poet and on the reader in
order ‘to recognize the energies that are transferred between people when a
poem is given and taken’.39 Like Dewey, she imagines this as an empathetic
exchange that relies in part on cumulative experience.
For Rukeyser, the ‘multiple time-sense in poetry’ means that it is unfixed,
shared, and associative; it incorporates both ‘the ever new’ and that which is
‘recognized as something already in ourselves’.40 In the giving and taking of a
poem, there exists a recognition of the shared continuity of human experience
that Dewey sees in art. Rukeyser states:
The experience with which we deal, in speaking of art and human growth, is not
only the event, but the event and the entire past of the individual.… You read
the poem: the poem you now have, the poem that exists in your imagination, is
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the poem and all the past to which you refer it. The poet, by the same token, is
the man (is the woman) with all the poet’s past life, at the moment the poem is
finished; that is, at the moment of reaching a conclusion, of understanding
further what it means to feel these relationships.41
These relationships are felt imaginatively and viscerally in what Rukeyser
terms ‘exchanges’ of ‘human energy’, which, like Dewey’s ‘organization of
energies’, ‘sum up and carry forward’ aesthetic experience.42 Rukeyser like-
wise views the aesthetic or poetic as an unfinished democratic project: a
mode of relational living that acknowledges the sociality in human life, a con-
tinuous process of interaction, challenge, and development. This democratic
impulse is, according to Rukeyser, ‘the deep life of poetry’, ‘reflecting [our]
lives’ – so that ‘the truth of the poem is the truth of the poet and the reader’.43
It is only in the creative exchange engendered by aesthetic experience that
space is made for what Rukeyser famously calls ‘a poetry of meeting places,
where the false barriers go down’.44 One such barrier is between the functions
of the mind and the body: ‘We have used the term “mind”’, Rukeyser asserts,
‘and allowed ourselves to be trapped into believing there was such a thing,
such a place, such a locus of forces’. She continues, ‘we have used the word
“poem” and now the people who live by division quarrel about “the poem
as object”… It is not an object; the poem is a process’.45 As such, the
poem, and its correlative, the aesthetic experience, must be lived in fully
embodied encounter in order ‘to produce change from the existing con-
ditions’.46 The social and democratic potentialities of the aesthetic become
clearer when we recognise the ‘art in life’.47
In her ‘note from the author’, Rukeyser signals her intention for the book,
and for poetry, to constitute an ‘exercise’ for ‘people to use… in dealing with
the meanings in the world and in their lives’.48 She sets such aesthetic func-
tionality against the ways in which poetry, she argues throughout, has been
isolated from practical, everyday life in America; it is the ‘one kind of knowl-
edge – infinitely precious, time-resistant more than monuments, here to be
passed between generations in any way it may be: never to be used.’49 As
Dewey sees ‘art’ (a term which develops throughout his book to include an
experience garnered through the production and reception of an aesthetic
object, including a written one), so Rukeyser sees ‘poetry’ (which she
occasionally calls ‘art’)50: a crucial ‘resource we are not using’ due to the
fact that ‘our education is one of specialisation. We become experts in
some narrow “field”… [which] allows us to face emotional reality, symbolic
reality, very little’.51
Rukeyser cites the isolating practices of the contemporary New Criticism as
exemplary of this anti-pragmatic stance. Such self-contained formalism, she
notes, which addresses poetry primarily in terms of its ‘words’ rather than
its images, is an exercise in ‘dissecting poetry’, thereby ‘letting the life
escape’.52 The ‘static mechanics’ of such criticism counts in discrete units,
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rather than appreciates in fluidity, the elements of poetry, denying its status as
‘a process, in which motion and relationship are always present’.53 Rukeyser’s
frustration with this separatist stance continued throughout her life. In the
1976 collection The Gates (named after her experience protesting the death
sentence of the poet Kim Chi-Ha at the gates of his prison in South Korea
– which she calls ‘also the gates of perception, the gates of the body’54), Rukey-
ser published the poem, ‘Islands’, which imagines a group of bathers in a ‘glit-
tering sea’ between two geological promontories, and begins, ‘O for God’s
sake/they are connected/underneath’, and ends, ‘The bathers think/islands
are separate like them’.55 Like Dewey’s ‘mountain peaks’ that ‘do not float
unsupported’ but ‘are the earth’, Rukeyser’s ‘islands’ must be considered as
constitutive of the interconnectedness that runs through and is the foundation
of all natural things, despite appearance otherwise.
Therefore, for Rukeyser, as for Dewey, poetry constitutes a vital, and vita-
lising, aspect of human experience that perforce renders it aesthetic – one that
conjoins the biological and the psychological in an embodied dynamic of
transactional exchange that arrives primarily as ‘emotion’, or ‘feeling’ (‘A
fine poem will seize your imagination intellectually… but the way is
through emotion, through what we call feeling’56). The mark of literary
critic I. A. Richards on Rukeyser’s thinking is clear here; her notes for The
Life of Poetry contain numerous quotations from his 1926 Science and
Poetry, including the lines that ‘poetry is the recording of phases during
which conciliations have been effected, showing conflict’, and that poetry
engenders the ‘emotive state, making us remember how we felt’.57 Yet her
understanding of the connections between the imagination and the emotions,
between art and science, moves beyond Richards’s espousal of a type of Gibb-
sian change of phase to an embodied aesthetics of meaning. Her approach is
more aligned with that of Dewey, who also draws from Richards’s work in Art
as Experience. Dewey agrees with Richards’s proposition that the ‘value’ of the
aesthetic object resides not in its materiality, but in the ‘experience’ it gener-
ates in the perceiver, but suggests Richards overlooks the fact that the aesthetic
‘total effect’ is only ‘brought about by interaction of external and organic
causes’. For Dewey, one must understand that the ‘atoms, electrons,
protons’ that create the effect of the visual image interact with ‘the mind
through the organism’ to create the total aesthetic experience.58
For Rukeyser, ‘over-specialization’ is profoundly connected with ‘the
ruling-out of emotion’, which is in turn a manifestation of ‘the aversion to
the disclosure of oneself to oneself’.59 Again in words strikingly similar to
Dewey’s, Rukeyser classifies this aversion throughout her book as ‘fear’ – ‘a
fear of poetry’, which she variously delineates as a fear of ‘feeling’, of ‘com-
munication’, of ‘the imagination’, and, connecting all of these, of the
‘foreign’.60 While for both writers, such fear signals a withdrawal from the
potential interactive, aesthetic totality of human experience, Rukeyser
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recognises the effects and implications for society on a scale more attuned not
only to her current moment, but to the ‘repressive codes’ that seek to engender
this aversion.61
Foreign bodies
Writing during the McCarthy era (the FBI file on Rukeyser is a long one), in
the wake of two world wars, Rukeyser points to her country’s commitment,
despite being a nation of immigrants, ‘to rule out any foreignness, any
color, at all’.62 In the section of The Life of Poetry called ‘The Resistances’,
Rukeyser states that because we are taught that ‘poetry is foreign to us, we
do not let it enter our daily lives’.63 She examines in detail the conditions of
‘the fear of poetry’, contending that America suffers from a ‘hunger for uni-
formity’, and connecting this misplaced need to the censorship and lack of
experimentation in the arts, post-war. ‘This code’, she asserts, ‘strikes deep
at our emotional life’, leading us ‘to meet any divergence from the expected
with dread or conflict’.64 The dread extends to the bodies, and embodied prac-
tices, of those deemed nonconformist or irregular, who, like poetry, have ‘no
acknowledged place in American society today’.65 ‘The barriers that have been
set up are strong’, Rukeyser asserts, and generate in social life fearful resist-
ance to ‘targets’ such as ‘the Negroes, the Reds, the Jews, the “place” of
science, the “place” of labor, the “place” of women, and poetry’.66 As a
queer woman, a Leftist, a Jew, an advocate of labour activism, of the voices
and cultures of people of colour, of the disenfranchised, of the life of
poetry, Rukeyser’s ‘place’ is firmly established as one – indeed, many – of
such ‘targets’. Little wonder that, in an environment of such stifling white
patriarchal control and political paternalism, she notes poetry’s established
position as ‘sexually suspect’.67
The universalising naturalist aesthetics of Dewey’s Art as Experience, then,
are reshaped in Rukeyser’s The Life of Poetry to acknowledge that the ‘fear’
seen by both writers as obstructive to aesthetic experience is lodged not
only in an aversion to self-realisation and the ‘biological commonplaces’ of
the ‘live creature’, but in an anxious withdrawal from all forms of what has
been socially constructed as ‘the foreign’. The resistance to poetry is inextric-
able from the resistance to allowing interaction with the embodied existence
of the ‘other’; yet without it, a ‘total response’ to the world cannot be
achieved.68
Rukeyser felt first-hand the frustration at the systems of suppression, iso-
lation, and compartmentalisation that both she and Dewey highlight. Other
writers and editors, particularly those affiliated with the New Criticism Rukey-
ser spoke out against, attempted time and again to silence, pigeon-hole, or
pillory her due to the pluralistic nature of her politics and aesthetics, her
refusal to tread established ‘feminine’ writerly lines or toe entirely partisan
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ones.69 In a particularly misogynistic attack in 1943, for example, the editors
of Partisan Review not only ridiculed Rukeyser for ‘bandwagon’ jumping and
patriotic ‘neo-Americanism’ in her work for the Office of War Information
designing avant-garde posters for the war effort, but, as Alan Wald notes,
‘poke[d] fun at her weight and sexual appetites’.70 Rukeyser wrote privately
that she was left ‘too low to answer’, finding the piece ‘startlingly crude and
savage, [but] in its way, an example of the classical attack’.71 If Rukeyser’s
body and embodied poetics were deemed ‘sexually suspect’ throughout the
forties, The Life of Poetry, in its sheer thematic breadth, its generic unclassifia-
bility, its daring to call out such criticisms as ‘projection propped up with lies’
and such compartmentalisations as ‘false barriers’, constitutes a rare materi-
alisation of the type of total aesthetic experience Rukeyser and Dewey aim
towards.72 It both stands for Rukeyser, and as Eileen Myles notes, is her
‘podium’. It is a document of ‘a woman taking space and refusing to sit
down’.73 And in its cumulative presentation of the poet’s ‘long preparation
of the self to be used’,74 it is, Myles asserts, ‘pure American pragmatism’.75
In the section called ‘The “Uses” of Poetry’, Rukeyser delineates how the
self might be used. She imagines the intimacy and anticipation of a darkened
theatre before curtain-up. Writing in direct address, she notes the closeness of
her body to her addressee (‘we almost touch’), their shared biological pro-
cesses (‘we breathe this air’), and a proprioceptive sense of herself in relation
to the foreign bodies that surround her, whose corporeally expressed
emotions afford her an interpersonal connection that establishes equality
through difference:
When you laugh, I feel it, and I feel the man in front of me throw himself back
in his seat and stiffen his back when the dangers make themselves apparent.…
We sit here, very different from each other, until the passion arrives to give us
our equality, and to make us part of the play, to make the play part of us. An
exchange is being effected.76
In this brief description of a shared, embodied aesthetics, Rukeyser imagines a
pluralistic act of perception to evince several meanings. The human body is
here ‘used’ and perceived simultaneously as a biological organism, and as
an ecological, social, cultural, and phenomenological body. As Maurice
Merleau-Ponty, in The Phenomenology of Perception asserts, ‘my body
appears to me as an attitude directed towards a certain existing or possible
task.’ As such, it occupies not ‘a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situ-
ation’.77 When Rukeyser writes of ‘the attitude of poetry’ as containing the
potential to ‘equip our imaginations to deal with our lives’, she intends a
similar combination of mental and physical approach. ‘How do we use
feeling? How do we use truth?’ she asks.78 One answer is to open ourselves
to the type of ‘exchange effected’ in the above example, which for Rukeyser,
holds the key to the socially equalising possibilities poetic experience allows.
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Embedded in this experience is a type of testimonial awareness. Unhappy
with the terms ‘audience’, ‘reader’, or ‘listener’ to describe the receiver of the
poem, Rukeyser searches for a term that will better communicate the
Deweyan twin concepts of doing and undergoing. She alights on ‘witness’,
which, she contests, ‘includes the act of seeing or knowing by personal experi-
ence, as well as the act of giving evidence.’ It contains overtones of ‘responsi-
bility’, ‘tension’, ‘excitement and revelation’ which give ‘air to the work of art,
announcing with the poem that we are about to change, that work is being
done on the self’.79 The word indicates what Rukeyser elsewhere calls ‘a trans-
fer of human energy… defined as consciousness, the capacity to make change
in existing conditions’.80 More than this, it recalls the ostensible reason for
The Life of Poetry’s very existence as ‘index’ and ‘exercise’ – its accumulation
of recalled memory, imagination, belief, and hope: Perched in an overcrowded
boat fleeing the onset of the Spanish Civil War, Rukeyser and her fellow refu-
gees are told of their ‘responsibility’: ‘“go home: tell your peoples what you
have seen”’.81 She is soon posed the question by the man next to her: ‘“And
poetry – among all this – where is there a place for poetry?”’82 Rukeyser’s
response/responsibility is the book that follows: testimony and testimonial
to an ethical aesthetics of human meaning.
An embodied kind of knowledge: the insight and enduring
relevance of The Life of Poetry
Rukeyser’s appeal, at the start of The Life of Poetry, to the reclamation of
poetry as ‘a kind of knowledge’, is perhaps even more relevant today than
when it was originally made, despite her warning in 1949 that ‘we face hor-
izons and conflicts wider than ever before’.83 In this final section of the
essay, I wish to signpost some of the ways in which Rukeyser’s The Life of
Poetry advanced a pragmatist aesthetics to anticipate contemporary philos-
ophies of embodied meaning-making. Such philosophies, their advocates
and practitioners contend, allow us to construct a more integrated aesthetics
of human use and significance than traditional Western philosophies – and
several institutional literary approaches84 – have permitted, retaining a
Deweyan dedication to art and aesthetics as ‘the quest for concretely embo-
died meaning and value in human existence’.85
A key philosopher drawing on the connections between cognitive science,
phenomenology, and linguistics to investigate ‘bodily sources of meaning,
imagination, and reasoning’ today is Mark Johnson.86 In his 2007 book,
The Meaning of the Body, Johnson puts forward his case for a new ‘aesthetics
of human understanding’.87 Positing that ‘we need a Dewey for the twenty-
first century’, Johnson grounds what he calls his ‘embodied theory of
meaning’ in classical American pragmatism, arguing for a renewed approach
to ‘the bodily depths of human meaning-making through our visceral
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connection to the world’.88 According to Johnson, an ‘exploration into the
qualities, feelings, emotions, and bodily processes that make meaning poss-
ible’ requires the understanding that ‘aesthetics must not be narrowly con-
strued as the study of art and so-called aesthetic experience… [but] the
study of everything that goes into the human capacity to make and experience
meaning’.89
Following Dewey, Johnson thus develops an aesthetics that explores ‘how
meaning is possible for creatures with our types of bodies, environments, and
cultural institutions and practices’; a theory that ‘start[s] deep down in the
bodily processes where meaning emerges, lives and grows’.90 ‘An embodied
view’, argues Johnson, ‘is naturalistic, insofar as it situates meaning within a
flow of experience that cannot exist without a biological organism engaging
its environment’.91 Hence, Johnson’s first position, like that of the pragma-
tists, is to eschew the Cartesian dualism that has led to embedded Western
assumptions about the disembodiment of the ‘higher’, rational faculties,
and instead embrace Dewey’s ‘principle of continuity’, which until the late
twentieth century was largely ignored, but which stated that ‘”mind” and
“body” are merely abstracted aspects of the flow of organism-environment
interactions that constitutes what we call experience’.92 From this position,
Johnson embarks on his aesthetics of human meaning, drawing on recent
advances in what he notes as new pragmatist sciences and philosophies of
mind to unfold a multi-layered thesis exploring embodied experience in
movement, childhood, emotions, conceptualisations, images, communication
and language, and the written, visual and performative arts. Remarkably, each
of these subjects was addressed by Rukeyser 60 years prior, in her own aesthe-
tical treatise on human meaning, The Life of Poetry. Some of these subjects I
will address below.
Movement: whole-body processes
As Johnson asserts, ‘life and movement are inextricably connected’.93 A sig-
nificant amount of our perceptual knowledge derives from our phenomeno-
logical orientation in the world, as well as the more hidden rhythms of our
bodily processes. Philosopher of mind Shaun Gallagher has called these non-
conscious processes body schema: ‘a system of sensory-motor capacities that
function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring’,94
and include, according to Johnson, ‘visceral processes performed by the res-
piratory, digestive, cardiovascular, urogenital, and endocrine systems’, all of
which, to varying degrees, impact on our perceptions and feelings.95
Johnson appeals to the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, an ex-dancer-chor-
eographer and professor of phenomenology and the embodied mind, in order
to discuss researches into conscious and nonconscious mind–body–world
interactions. Sheets-Johnstone’s contributions to ‘pragmatist
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neurophilosophy’96 are especially relevant here, as she employs William
James’s views on the relation between mind and body to demonstrate the
importance of the pragmatist legacy to contemporary neuroscience. In par-
ticular, she draws on James’s analogy between breathing, thinking, and
emoting to highlight recent studies in ‘coordination dynamics’, which
negate either/or categories and pinpoint ‘neurological and behavioural com-
plementarities such as stability∼instability, convergence∼divergence… inspi-
ration and expiration’.97
Agreeing with James’s hypothesis that ‘the stream of thinking’ is a
‘dynamic phenomenon’, another ‘name for what, when scrutinised, reveals
itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing’, Sheets-Johnstone
reflects that the commonalities between inspiration and expiration move
beyond linguistic coincidence.98 Inspirations bring fresh ideas as well as
fresh air; exhalations communicate valence, releasing tension as well as
carbon dioxide. She quotes from James’s The Principles of Psychology to indi-
cate breathing’s emotional qualities:
We ‘catch our breath’ at every sudden sound. We ‘hold our breath’ whenever
our attention and expectation are strongly engaged, and we sigh when the
tension of the situation is relieved. When a fearful object is before us we
pant and cannot deeply inspire; when the object makes us angry it is, on the
contrary, the act of expiration which is hard.99
However, Sheets-Johnstone points out that James neglects ‘something foun-
dational to animate life’ in his discussion on breathing-thinking: ‘kinesthesia,
the phenomenon of movement itself’.100 Drawing on examples of how ‘reach-
ing, walking and embracing’ are ‘kinetic themes tied intimately with the flow
of our breath’, Sheets-Johnstone notes that in terms of body schema, the res-
piratory centre – ‘sequestered in the lowly brain stem’ – is ‘powerfully inter-
connected with all that lies above and below, from frontal lobes to toes’.101
Again, the stress is on visceral cooperative interaction, whereby apparently
opposing dualisms are shown to work in complementarity.
As I have already mentioned, a keynote of The Life of Poetry is movement.
Much like the pragmatist, whole-body dynamics that Sheets-Johnstone high-
lights, Rukeyser’s relational poetics insist on a ‘dynamics of poetry’ in which
‘poetry depends on the moving relations within itself’, in turn ‘expressing and
evoking the moving relation between individual consciousness and the
world’.102 Breathing and thinking, emotion and motion are inextricable for
Rukeyser, part of the same dynamic system of consciousness. The first line
of the first poem of Rukeyser’s first book reads ‘Breathe-in experience,
breathe-out poetry’:103 it heralds the lasting theme throughout her work of
the physical intake and output of embodied experience, entailing an energy
exchange both within, and, as her theatrical example demonstrates, between
bodies. Connected to what she terms ‘the fear of poetry’, then, is, in Jamesian
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terms, the denial or repression of one’s emotive responses to the world and to
others: inspiration and expiration are affected; a complementary energy
exchange is compromised. Likewise, the psychologically inflected anger that
Rukeyser notes so many feel towards poetry in its apparent ‘obscurity’
renders difficult the positive release of built-up tensions; it stifles the ‘breath-
ing-out’ of poetry.104
Rukeyser’s commitment to the necessity of dynamic relation in an aes-
thetics of human meaning-making connects to Johnson and Sheets-John-
stone’s neuroscience-supported comprehension of movement as a basis for
embodied meaning. To take three examples from the ‘visceral processes’
listed by Johnson above, Rukeyser explores the relevance of respiratory, car-
diovascular, and endocrine systems to aesthetic experience, particularly in
relation to Walt Whitman. In Whitman, whose body and whose body of
work, like Rukeyser’s, were deemed ‘sexually suspect’, Rukeyser finds an
example of a poet whose verse is instructively kinaesthetic – he understood
that ‘the imaginative function includes the senses’.105 Rukeyser presents
Whitman as a ‘poet of possibility’ who ‘made his music signify’ ‘not out of
English prosody but the fluids of organism… the rhythms of pulse and
lung’, who ‘out of his own body, and its relation to itself and to the sea,
drew his basic rhythms’.106 These are rhythms, Rukeyser recognises, ‘of the
relation of our breathing to our heartbeat…measured against an ideal of
water at the shore, not beginning nor ending, but endlessly drawing in…
always making a meeting place’.107
The impressiveness of Rukeyser’s analysis resides not in recognising Whit-
man’s luxuriating both in his own corporeality and in the liberated poetic line
that such sensate attention permits; it is in her insistence on the meaningful
connection between Whitman’s art and his whole-body relation with his
environment – natural, social, and political. In one of the most daring and
sustained passages of The Life of Poetry, Rukeyser posits that Whitman’s
own self-conflict and struggle for internal complementarity – derived from
the fluidity of his sexual orientation, from his attempts to identify with the
myriad faces of diverse Americans, from his wish to encompass the good
and the bad aspects of his country, ‘with its power, war, Congress,
weapons, testimony, and endless gestation’ – was interconnectedly psycho-
logical and biological.108 Referring in detail to Whitman’s autopsy report,
and noting in it ‘remarks which no writer – medical or lay – seems to have
analyzed’, Rukeyser draws attention to a hitherto overlooked abnormality
in Whitman’s body schema: a large cyst on the suprarenal capsule of his left
kidney.109 Considering recent researches into ‘glandular equilibrium’ and
‘the suprarenal-pituitary-sex hormone relation’, Rukeyser ‘venture[s] to
suggest that the inclusive personality which Whitman created from his own
conflict is heroic proof of a life in which apparent antagonisms have been
reconciled and purified into art’.110 Her suggestion is nothing short of
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extraordinary, not only because she breaks disciplinary barriers to make it,
and not least for the confidence with which she – a woman, a poet, a bisexual
– offers the diagnosis, but also for the trailblazing nature of its viscerally bio-
logical, embodied aesthetics, its collapsing of distinctions between ‘higher’ and
‘lower’ faculties, and its foregrounding of sexuality as a key element in Whit-
man’s inclusive poetics. It anticipates Johnson’s claim that ‘imagination is tied
to our bodily processes and can also be creative and transformative of
experience’.111
Movement: childhood and the ‘primitive’
Johnson understands the ‘visceral’ to mean both the specific, hidden biological
processes noted above, and the more general phenomena of human feelings.
He quotes Sheets-Johnstone on how both meanings are inseparable, formed in
infanthood as a ‘primal animateness’, an ‘original kinetic spontaneity that
infuses our being and defines our aliveness… our point of departure for
living in the world and making sense of it’.112 Johnson devotes a significant
portion of his study to parsing contemporary researches into ‘the many
bodily ways by which infants and children find and make meaning’, and
how these methods are ‘carried forward into, and thus underlie and make
possible, our mature acts of understanding, conceptualization, and reason-
ing’.113 He uses these to make the case that, ‘as Dewey argued’:
Philosophy needs to help us re-establish our visceral connections to ourselves,
to other people, and to the world. It should help us rediscover the experiential
depth of the situations we find ourselves in, so that we can base our inquiry and
decisions on an appropriately complex understanding of the meaning of what
we are encountering.114
Rukeyser, in The Life of Poetry, similarly suggests an aesthetics of human
meaning that draws in part from a deeper understanding of such ‘visceral
connections’:
If we lived in full response to the earth, to each other, and to ourselves, we
would not breathe a supernatural climate; we would be more human. The ten-
dency of art and religion, and the tendency of poetic meaning, is toward the
most human. It is a further humanity we are trying to achieve… and to
communicate.115
Rukeyser aligns this ideal ‘full response’ to the ‘primal animateness’ of child-
hood. Children, Rukeyser argues, do not view poetry as ‘foreign’ or as fearful,
because children ‘trust their emotions’.116 Following the psychoanalytic tra-
dition, Rukeyser links childhood to the idea of the ‘primitive’, but retrieves
from this not a set of basic urges and burgeoning complexes, but a growing
matrix of embodied impulses that centralise what modern society increasingly
denies: ‘the dynamic character of our lives’.117 She refers to the ethnographic
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work of John Collier among North American ‘Indians’ to emphasise how
those judged as ‘primitive’ peoples evidence an ‘imaginative maturity’ that
is lacking in ostensibly ‘civilized’ society.118
Citing Collier’s findings that in ‘primitive society’, the group does not
shape itself toward conduct, but ‘molds its members toward emotion,
toward… experience’,119 Rukeyser celebrates the group’s concentration
‘upon education – upon personality development’:
Every experience is used to that end… There results an integration of body–
mind and of individual-group which is not automatic, not at the level of confor-
mity or habit, but spontaneous, essentially spiritual, and at the level of
freedom.120
In contrast, ‘our’ society suffers from an ‘impoverishment of imagination’ that
is connected to our self-inflicted emotional amputation.121 By witnessing this
now foreign way of living, Rukeyser contests that we are brought nearer to our
childhood receptivity and emotional openness, to the buried strangeness in
ourselves. The moment is akin to the impact the poem makes on our cumu-
lative experience, joining our past and present so that ‘we become more of our
age and more primitive. Not primitive as the aesthetes have used the term’,
Rukeyser qualifies, ‘but complicated, fresh, full of dark meaning, insisting
on discovery, as the experience of a woman giving birth to a child is
primitive’.122
The child and the ‘primitive’ are both what Rukeyser terms ‘indexes’ for
poetry because they constitute what is ‘socially unacceptable’ in America’s
‘adult’ power culture.123 Not bound by the repressive social codes that ‘cut
[us] off from large areas in ourselves’,124 they are connected in The Life of
Poetry via their innate capacity to construct meaning out of corporeal
rhythm, embodied most obviously in song and dance. While Rukeyser indi-
cates that we might learn a visceral aesthetics of humanity from the chants
and dance rituals of the Navajo, who ‘excel’ in ‘rhythm… in joy of life… in
art propensities, and in truthfulness’,125 she devotes significant discussion
to the similar qualities of children, whose ‘rhythm-songs’, she asserts,
remind us of poetry.126
Drawing on recent studies in child development,127 Rukeyser notes that
children tend not to separate ‘work’ from ‘play’ in song, rhythm, and
music-making; their methods of engaging with their environment often
entail experiments in imitation, language, and movement wherein all three
merge in a ‘fluid’ learning experience, resulting in a type of musical
‘speech’.128 She suggests the example of a little boy driving a toy car up a
chair-back, making a ‘babble of syllables’ that signify the car, its direction,
and ‘his pleasure most of all’. ‘To anyone listening who is willing to put
away the grown-up distinctions and impatiences’, Rukeyser states, it is ‘pri-
marily an expression: the sound and the act both “meaning” car-and-up;
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or, something like up-sounds-car’.129 The unadulterated, embodied experi-
ence of the child here is what Rukeyser recognises as the ‘tendency of
poetic meaning’ and the root of emotional truth. Whereas adults ‘long to
impose a program’ on their songs and speech patterns, the child’s ‘conscious-
ness of rhythm, and in fact his concepts, cannot be satisfied or judged by adult
standards. He is interested in things as themselves, he… is not concerned
with what he should feel’.130
Johnson’s appeal to the practices of meaning-making in childhood reveals
the same understanding of the necessity for adults to learn from the embodied
aesthetics of infant learning. He acknowledges that ‘our experience of
meaning is based, first, on our sensorimotor experience, our feelings, and
our visceral connections to the world; and second, on various imaginative
capacities for using sensorimotor processes to understand abstract con-
cepts’.131 Johnson discusses advances in cognitive linguistics and neuroscience
(driven by himself, Mark Turner, and George Lakoff) that have cemented the
embodied origin of image schemas – the ‘dynamic, recurring pattern[s] of
organism-environment interactions’ that become conceptual abstractions in
human thought and underlie what we conceive of as true.132 These include
the ways in which we conceptualise time (because of our corporeal makeup,
we consider the future in front of us), and spatial movement (a well-known
image schema is SOURCE-PATH-GOAL). Image schemas demonstrate that ‘cog-
nition is an organic, embodied process of enaction in which the organism is
dynamically engaged with its surroundings’.133 They connect with conceptual
metaphors, by which we construct and navigate meaning, such as UNDER-
STANDING IS SEEING, and UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING.134
Johnson highlights that, in contradistinction to ‘large parts of traditional
Western philosophical theories of meaning and truth’, the anti-Cartesian
nature of conceptual metaphors locates abstract thought and reasoning in
‘our bodily, sensorimotor experience’,135 inextricable from feeling, and orig-
inating in childhood physical development and language acquisition.136
That Rukeyser’s child is ‘not concerned with what he should feel’, only
caught up in the embodied expression of feeling, is also core to contemporary
understandings of pre-linguistic meaning-making. Quoting Colwyn Tre-
varthen’s work on infant-caregiver coordination, Johnson highlights the
importance of ‘an infant’s making “a statement of feeling” in the form of a
movement of the body, a change in hand gesture’, etc.137 Thanks to the dis-
covery of mirror neurons in the human brain, we can now better comprehend
empathetic intersubjectivity: the same neurons activate in the brain of a
person performing a physical gesture as activate in the brain of a person
merely observing that gesture being performed.138 Johnson connects these
understandings to what Daniel Stern, in The Interpersonal World of the
Infant (1985), calls ‘vitality affects’, which arise out of our ‘emergent sense
of self’ in early infanthood, and are ‘captured by dynamic, kinetic terms,
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such as “surging”, “fading away”, “fleeting”’, and so on.139 Combined with
words or sounds (a mother soothingly patting a baby’s back and uttering
‘there, there, there’, for example), these affects create ‘contours’ and ‘patterns’
of cross-modal perception.
Johnson notes that it ‘is important to recognise that what Stern identifies as
being at the heart of an infant’s sense of itself and the meaning of its experi-
ence also lies at the heart of meaning in an adult’s experience’,140 and
bemoans that Western philosophies of mind and language have historically
ignored this fact. Urging repeatedly for a reappraisal of the necessity of aes-
thetic, embodied experience, Johnson cites Stern’s use of
dance and music as exemplars of the way meaning can be tied to patterns of
feeling: ‘Dance reveals to the viewer-listener multiple vitality affects and their
variations, without resorting to plot or categorical affect signals from which
the vitality affects can be derived’.
Indeed, music theory has long associated music and dance’s power to their
‘imaginative presentation of patterns of feeling’.141
At various intervals in The Life of Poetry, Rukeyser reaches the same con-
clusions. In her extended discussion of what we might call the cross-modal
vitality affects in Whitman’s poetry, Rukeyser argues that such contours
arise because of Whitman’s whole-body acceptance of his relation to his
environment, so that he was able to write ‘Be not afraid of my body,/I am a
dance’.142 She avers (via R. G. Collingwood’s 1938 Principles of Art,143 and
with a nod to Spinoza) that true statements of feeling are made within the
context of experiential association with the world (‘the statement this is
how I feel, implies a rejection of its opposite’) – a condition that also takes
shape in ‘the realization of a poem’.144 Combatting what she sees as her
era’s pervasive ‘literature of aversion’, Rukeyser foregrounds poetry as a litera-
ture of redirection, because ‘one of the invitations of poetry is to come to the
emotional meanings at every moment. That is one reason for the high concen-
tration of music in poetry’.145 Describing the embodied expression of Blues
music, or the patterns of feeling in the rhythmic behavioural contours of
the pre-socialised child or the Navajo, whose ‘dance rhythms are brought
into poetry’,146 Rukeyser turns frequently to dance as exemplary of the
whole-body emotional truth that poetry communicates, but notes, like
Johnson, how Western traditions of disembodied thought have largely
denied such relational aesthetics.
While she lists a few exceptions from her own era – ‘Martha Graham,
essaying Emily Dickinson’, ‘Anna Sokolow, Jane Dudley’, even ‘Fred
Astaire’147 – Rukeyser finds a wordless poetry in a particular example of
Eastern art: the frescoes of the life of Buddha on the walls of the Ajanta
caves in India.148 In the caves, one’s corporeal phenomenology is emphasised
because the painter-monks ‘felt that the sensation of space within ourselves is
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the analogy by which the world is known’.149 The cave, a space where philo-
sophical spirituality is encouraged through organic physicality, works accord-
ing to Rukeyser as a sort of projected internal panorama, surrounding the
viewer with the ‘figures of [their] consciousness’, ‘strung together by their
rhythm’.150 Rukeyser’s description of her (imaginary) experience in the
caves is reminiscent of the pre-linguistic, embodied experiences she earlier
relates to childhood and the poetics of meaning-making: ‘all the forms wait
for their full language. The poems of the next moment are at hand’.151 The
paintings thus demonstrate to Rukeyser a ‘web of movement’; a human
‘dance… to be acknowledged in art’: Here, ‘the Western idea of still life is
unknown. There is no still life, there is life, and all life shares the movement
of the mind. In living reality, all is movement’.152
There is no still life
Rukeyser’s vivid and ‘total response’ to the Ajanta caves espouses a deeply
Deweyan pragmatist aesthetics, echoed in Johnson’s simple avowal that
‘movement is life… one of the conditions for our sense of what our world
is like and who we are’.153 The caves’ images are akin to the images
brought forth by poetry, the language of which reaches far beyond the linguis-
tic to conjoin memory and imagination in dynamic, somatic experience. In
the same section that she espouses ‘witness’ as a key term for the person
undergoing an aesthetic experience, Rukeyser refers to a recent scientific
study, in which test subjects were shown images of their own bodies in
stasis (their hands, their face in profile, their body from behind), and then
in motion (‘face blanked out’). The vast majority of the subjects could only
recognise their own bodies in motion, because Rukeyser surmises, ‘our
rhythms are more recognisably our selves than any of our forms’.154 She pro-
poses, without knowing about the existence of mirror neurons, that watching
such corporeal rhythms triggers a sense of ‘empathy’ in the viewer, and goes
further, suggesting that these rhythms and empathetic recognitions are also
triggered by poetic images.
For Rukeyser, the dynamism of the poetic image joins form and rhythm
organically, so that we come to understand not only the life of poetry, but
the poetry of life. Thus, she ventures poetry as a naturalistic aesthetics not
only of human, but of universal meaning. Citing Einstein’s proposition that
events in nature are bound by an as yet unknown connective law that we mis-
takenly understand as cause and effect, Rukeyser states her belief ‘that one sug-
gestion of such a law is to be found in the process of poetry’.155 Her insistence
on the synaesthetic and emotive qualities of images as aesthetic dimensions to
embodied meaning pre-empt what neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has
theorised as a combinative flow of sensual and cognitive processes:
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By the term images I mean mental patterns with a structure built with the
tokens of each of the sensory modalities – visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory,
and somatosensory.… The word image does not refer to ‘visual’ image alone,
and there is nothing static about images either.… In short, the process we
come to know as mind when mental images become ours… is a continuous
flow of images, many of which turn out to be logically interrelated.…
Thought is an acceptable word to denote such a flow of images.156
Unsurprisingly, Damasio cites the felt meaning of music as a prime example
of what he intends by this description of interwoven images. For Rukeyser,
and the theorists of embodied mind that came after her, the aesthetic image
is somatically holistic and unfixed; not a representation of life, but the form
of life itself. It follows, then, that opening ourselves to poetry is not only a
life-affirming act, but one that is potentially life-saving. Rukeyser contends:
‘Our lives may rest on this, and our lives are our images’.157
Coda
This essay has gone some way to situating The Life of Poetry as a crucial and
prescient text of multivalent, pragmatist aesthetics, in which the embodied
dimensions of everyday experience are key to human understanding and
meaning-making. Deweyan at core, The Life of Poetry predicts in part what
Shusterman, working in the tradition of Dewey and Merleau-Ponty, has
coined ‘somaesthetics’: ‘the critical, meliorative study of the experience and
use of one’s body as a locus of sensory-aesthetic appreciation and self-fashion-
ing’.158 Combining analytical, pragmatic, and practical perspectives159 on the
study of art, beauty, and the body, Shusterman proposes a cross-disciplinary,
embodied aesthetics in order to promote the interconnectedness of the aes-
thetic and socio-political realms of human life. I have hopefully begun to
demonstrate the ways in which Rukeyser’s project seeks to make similar
‘meeting places’ between the realms of human experience traditionally under-
stood to exist in dualistic opposition. Indeed, in several cases, the ‘meeting
place’ of such oppositions is the human body itself – often, Rukeyser’s own.
Many of her poems, as well as large portions of The Life of Poetry, stem
from Rukeyser’s embodied and testimonial experience of social realities. As
Jane Cooper has noted, ‘she wanted to be there. One way of witnessing was
to write. Another was to put her body on the line, literally’.160
The embodied aesthetics of Rukeyser’s treatise teaches us to each, in some
way, put our own body ‘on the line’ by recognising the visceral interconnec-
tions of ourselves with others, and with our shared world. From such recog-
nition, which Rukeyser argues is both the generative force and cumulative
effect of poetry, comes an understanding of everyday, human experience as
somatically integrated and socially dependent. It also, as recent scientific
and philosophical studies have argued, locates our faculties of expression,
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feeling, reasoning, and conceptualisation in a dynamic matrix of somatic, visc-
eral existence. For Dewey as for Rukeyser, the most pressing task of aesthetic
experience is to grasp the present, ‘not as an immediate, isolated bare occur-
rence’, but as ‘the dynamically insistent occasion for establishing continuity or
growth of meaning’.161 This is the real democratic project; ‘the problematic
which calls forth reflective thinking, not just for now and again, but continu-
ously’.162 ‘In times of crisis’, Rukeyser states, ‘we summon up our strength’.
Then, if we are lucky, we are able to call every resource, every forgotten image
…And this luck is more than it seems to be: it depends on the long preparation
of the self to be used.163
To be meaningfully present involves an awareness of ‘our need for each other
and our need for ourselves’.164 It requires acting on this need in full compre-
hension that such action is pragmatically aesthetic, exercising both the
imagination and reflection towards the present moment’s possibilities.
Johnson has argued that ‘the art of our lives is the art of the meaning of
the body’.165 In her work of pragmatist aesthetics six decades earlier, Rukeyser
demonstrated that both exist in the life of poetry.
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